Understanding how government authority is distributed should be at heart of analyzing Alberta’s separatist movement
In September 1885, the renowned Plains Cree chief Big Bear was convicted of treason-felony for his involvement in the 1885 Northwest Resistance. The conviction rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of Nehiyaw political authority, where leadership was distributed between various positions—a Cree form of checks and balances within government. During the northwest resistance, authority had shifted from Big Bear to the war chief Wandering Spirit.
Over time, the historical legacy of Big Bear within Canadian public consciousness has shifted dramatically as people began to understand Big Bear in light of Plains Cree political traditions. Writer John Ralston Saul even went so far as to say, “I cannot think of another powerful leader in the history of Canada who so consciously and publicly lived by ethical decisions.”
Nonetheless, Big Bear still spent his final years imprisoned because the Canadian legal system was not able to comprehend how authority was distributed and could shift among many leaders.
Understanding how authority is distributed between various branches of government should be at the heart of analyzing the Alberta separatist movement today. Both Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators have prioritized a legal analysis of the issue. Yet, we should also consider how a political analysis can lead to substantially different interpretations and strategic responses to the same issues.
Recent commentary by lawyer Bruce McIvor has focused on a constitutional argument for why Alberta cannot separate from Canada without First Nations consent. For McIvor, the numbered treaties mean First Nations and the Crown are the “senior partners” at the constitutional table, while Alberta is at best a junior partner. After all, the treaties predate the creation of the province of Alberta. McIvor writes “The idea that Alberta can unilaterally secede from Canada is as absurd as suggesting that a child has the power to annul their parents’ marriage.”
I think McIvor is right to point out that within our constitutional democracy we are governed by the numbered treaties. But the metaphor of Alberta being a junior partner or a child feeds into the narratives of the Alberta separatist movement that Alberta will never be respected within the Canadian confederation. Framing the relationship between the province and Canada as a hierarchy contributes to a strength of the Alberta separatist movement, that they provide an opportunity for change and transformation unlike the unequal status quo offered by Canada.
From a legal perspective, it's very possible that the Canadian courts will side with McIvor, but from a political perspective such rhetoric might add fuel to the fire of the Alberta separatist movement. This matters strategically because we can also choose to emphasize treaties as agreements that form the basis of how we share the land in order to “enable mutual flourishing”.
My second example more squarely illustrates why we must consider the balance of power between different branches of government. Many have suggested that a positive secession result would create years of political and legal uncertainty while the courts sorted through the legality of the issue. But at a recent workshop, Bruce Tait, the former executive director of federal-provincial relations for the Alberta government, pointed out “that Canada’s recognition of international statehood is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the federal executive.”
In the case of a decisive referendum result, the federal executive might pre-empt a protracted legal process by recognizing Alberta independence, which would in turn be treated as a legal fact by the international community.
In other words, the judicial process is not necessarily an asset for those who oppose separation. If a decisive referendum were to occur, it would be the executive not the judicial branch of government that would drive authoritative decision-making, precisely to avoid the economic fallout from years of legal uncertainty. While such an outcome would be an aggressive act of colonialism, our current borders are also the result of Canadian colonialism. The strategic relevance for First Nations is we should be cautious about focusing too much of our strategic energy on the Canadian court system. As have argued elsewhere, an alternative is for First Nations to engage in an inter-Indigenous multilateralism. Ultimately, where First Nations will find strategic strength and creativity in this moment is by turning to each other instead of directing our energy toward the Canadian state.
Matthew Wildcat is a member of Ermineskin Cree Nation, and an associate professor and director of Indigenous governance in the faculty of native studies at the University of Alberta.
The Hill Times